By: Rachel Jung
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) is a tribunal within the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) dedicated to hearing patent cases, including patent invalidity challenges.[1] Since its establishment in 2012 by the America Invents Act (AIA), it has been a preferred venue over federal district courts due to its expedited procedures and lower costs.[2] However, there are fears that a recent development might cause it to fall out of favor with petitioners: on October 17, 2025, John Squire, the newly appointed director of USPTO, announced sweeping policy changes that could severely limit the scope of cases reviewed by the PTAB.
When a petition for an invalidity proceeding is filed at the PTAB, it first undergoes pre-institution review.[3] The issue at this stage is whether there is a certain likelihood that the petitioner can prove non-patentability so that the claim deserves a full trial. [4] The Board can also refuse to institute a trial on discretionary grounds regardless of the merits. [5]
The AIA vests the USPTO director with the authority to make institution decisions. [6] However, it has been standard practice for the director to delegate the authority to panels of judges at the PTAB.[7] That partially changed in March of this year, when Coke Morgan Stewart, Deputy Director of the USPTO, created a bifurcated process giving the director authority over the discretionary screening and leaving only the merits-based institution review to the PTAB.[8]
On October 17, 2025, less than a month after being sworn in as new Director, John Squires announced in an open letter that he was “reclaiming” the power over merits-based determinations as well.[9] The policy is open to feedback until November 17.[10] If implemented, this new rule would enable the director to personally examine both the merits and the discretionary factors alongside a three-judge panel.[11] Petitioners would no longer receive institution decisions written by judges that span dozens of pages, but short “summary notices” amounting to “thumbs up or down decisions.” [12]
Squires explains that the previous delegation model has created an appearance of self-incentivization at the PTAB by placing the power to institute and the power to adjudicate within one organization. [13] In his words, the Board has effectively been “filling its own docket.” [14] Moreover, he states the proposed change will more closely adhere to the intent of Congress in passing the AIA. [15] Overall, he believes this measure will enhance the transparency and integrity of the PTAB. [16]
Supporters of this new policy argue that large corporations have had too much leeway in “wearing down smaller innovators” through PTAB processes. [17] They believe that by making it harder to challenge patents, it can enable inventors to “rely on the strength of their patents” and be encouraged to create more innovation. [18]
On the other hand, critics hold that Squires might have effectively eliminated an avenue for patent litigation. They maintain that the Director’s heavy involvement in the institution review process might be perceived as affecting the fairness and reasonableness of the decision. [19]The brevity of the “summary notices”, they add, only increases the unpredictability – petitioners might be denied access to a Board proceeding without knowing why. [20] Their conclusion is that due to the uncertainty surrounding institution review, many petitioners are likely to be deterred from filing at the PTAB. [21]
Whatever the arguments on both sides, it is clear that the doors to the PTAB will be more heavily guarded after this rule. In fact, the Deputy Director’s adoption of the bifurcated process in March has alone yielded a 206% increase in the number of discretionary denials in the third quarter of 2025 as compared to all of 2024. [22]
Considering that PTAB proceedings are often used as a defense strategy against patent infringement claims, [23] companies will now be motivated to invest more money into freedom to operate analyses – searches for active patents that their invention might infringe on – in early stages of product development, obtain licenses from patent owners, or design around existing patents. [24]
Furthermore, experts predict increased demand for other means of challenging patents. [25] One alternative is ex parte reexamination, a process where patent examiners at the USPTO, not the PTAB judges, reexamine the validity decision.[26] More parties might resort to court litigation. [27]
With such uncertainty ahead, intellectual property professionals would be wise to monitor the evolving situation and adapt their strategies accordingly.
[1]What is the Patent Trial and Appeal Board?, Winston & Strawn LLP, https://www.winston.com/en/legal-glossary/patent-trial-and-appeal-board (last visited Nov. 1, 2025)
[2]Daniel C. Cooley et al., PTAB Basics: Key Features of Trials Before the USPTO, Finnigan, https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/ptab-basics-key-features-of-trials-before-the-uspto.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2025).
[3]Id.
[4]Id.
[5]Id.
[6]John A. Squires, An Open Letter from America’s Innovation Agency (2025), https://assets.law360news.com/2404000/2404840/squires%20letter.pdf.
[7]USTPO Proposes New Institution Rules and Director Takes Over Merits-Based Institution Decision (Oct. 23, 2025), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2025/10/uspto-proposes-new-institution-rules-and-director-takes-over-merits-based-institution-decisions.
[8]Squires, supra note 5.
[9]Kass, supra note 7.
[10]Id.
[11]Id.
[12]Squires, supra note 5.
[13]Id.
[14]Id.
[15]Id.
[16]Ryan Davis, Patent Landscape Shifts as Squires Takes on Key PTAB Role, Law360 (Oct. 21, 2025, 10:25 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/2401378/.
[17]Id.
[18]Id.
[19]Id.
[20]Id.
[21]Ryan Davis, PTAB Discretionary Denials, Reexam Bids Way Up: Report, Law360 (Oct. 14, 2025, 9:32 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/2398603.
[22]See Davis, supra note 17.
[23]Id.
[24]Id.
[25]Id.
[26]Id.





